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A Creaturely Ethic: 
Veritatis Splendor and Human Nature 
By 
.J. F. Owens, Ph.D. 
The author received his doctorate in philosophy in 1987 from the 
University of Munich. He is currently a lecturer in philosophy at 
Mount Sf. Mary's Theological College, Auckland, New Zealand. 
I. 
Sometimes it helps to begin with the critics, if we are to understand what a 
document is about. We can learn something of the main preoccupations of 
Veritatis Splendor by looking at the position of two of its feminist critics. 
While in some respects their criticism is not well made, it serves 
nonetheless as a kind of exhibit, di splaying the habits of the heart which 
contemporary society assumes in reflecting on such issues. What is 
particularly striking is what they overlook, revealing a widespread and 
perhaps systematic blindness in face o f certain aspects of traditional ethical 
teaching. The authors consider the case of an Italian woman (Gianna 
Beretta Molla) who had a cancerous condition, which, if fully operated, 
would have ended the life of her unborn child . She chose to have only a 
minor operation, putting her life at risk to ensure that her child at least 
would live. And this is more or less what happened, the child being carried 
to term and the mother dying a few days after the birth . She was beatified 
by John Paul" in 1994. 1 
The criticism of the authors follows a predictable course. Presumably 
the strongest argument they could make is that such cases can be used to 
justify unhealthy suffering.2 What they actually say goes much further. 
They are against theologies that regard suffering as "a value in itself'; they 
insist that voluntary suffering is justified only if it leads to "a greater good 
which involves the alleviation of the suffering"; and they reject suffering 
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that is "coerced onto a group or individual. '" After giving a short account 
of the woman ' s life, the two critics make this comment: 
This account shows quite clearly the patriarchal thinking that assigns 
undue suffering to women in the name of strict adherence to a moral 
precept - a precept which no woman had any voice in articulating 
. .. Their (i.e. women's) suffering is literally spiritualized through 
beatification and is held up as a model of Christian faithfulness .4 
There are some detailed comments which could be made about these 
cntlclsms. For one thing, they seem to misrepresent the traditional 
Catholic position on such cases. But the overall thrust of the critique is 
clear enough, and encompasses two main points. The first touches 
suffering and its place in human life, whether it can ever playa positive 
role or have a significance in itself. Because they object to the social 
consequences of any positive value of suffering - i.e. , that we should see 
those who suffered as having benefited from their suffering, at least in 
some cases - the authors are unhappy that Gianna Molla should have been 
beatified. Raising such a person to sainthood sends the wrong signals to 
other women. The second point is political, that one group should not be 
telling another what to do, that at very least, a group needs representation 
among those who are formulating such principles. Behind this, we sense 
the guiding principle of the critique: the principle of autonomy. What is 
particularly is what the criticisms overlook. There is not the slightest sense 
that Mrs. Mol1a ' s action might have been a great human action for al1 that, 
displaying the human at its truest and best - even if it is admitted that it is 
not an action which others are obliged or even encouraged to imitate. Yet 
surely this is the way most people would judge Mrs. Mol1a ' s action, at least 
those whose minds are not contaminated by philosophy, theology, or 
politics. 
The authors of the article al10w that voluntary suffering is permissible 
in some cases. But it must ultimately be aimed at "the al1eviation of the 
suffering." There is only one clear category of actions which satisfies this 
criterion - that of the worker for justice, who suffers in order that others 
may not have to suffer.s Mrs. Molla ' s action fal1s far short of this, being 
focused only on a small part of the world, one with which she has 
immediate material connections, the life of the child growing within her. It 
lacks any direct political aim. Far from being directed towards al1eviating 
suffering, it seems to undergo it simply. Defenders of Mrs. Molla might 
suggest that her context of action is in fact larger than the authors of the 
article think - that it articulates something of the lasting human condition, 
showing forth (with al1 qualifications) what a human life at its best always 
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is and should be. But such an idea of the human condition is precisely 
what the authors of the article want to move away from. It would "present 
victimization as the normal experience of living.,,6 Their ideal human life 
looks quite different, being freed from the oppressive heteronomy of the 
past, and looking to what they call the promotion of "full humanity.,,7 With 
this we come to the second theme, that of autonomy. 
The authors' argument against the case of Gianna Molla from the 
standpoint of human autonomy is not particularly well made. The authors 
suggest that the saint was the victim of oppressive rules devised by others, 
that she lacked "choices and options", and may well have had private 
thoughts about her suffering which were quite different from those of the 
official account.8 This is deeply unfair to Mrs. Molla, who knew full well 
what she was doing, and that she could have done otherwise. She had 
qualified in 1949 as a doctor, after all. Her advisors did not put pressure on 
her to do what she did - if anything, they tried to dissuade her. Her real 
offense is not a lack of autonomy, but that her autonomous action took a 
direction of which the critics do not approve. If she had made a medical 
breakthrough, or had been the first woman in a particular field, showing 
other women that they could follow, it would be different. But to gain any 
credit in this frame of reference, she would have to advance the freedom of 
herself or of a larger group, opening up choices which were not there 
before. Presumably defenders of autonomy could in some cases praise 
people who gave their lives for others - revolutionary leaders might be an 
example. The problem with Gianna Molla ' s action is that it just does not 
look like this sort of autonomy, fitting too well into traditional 
understandings of the relation of mother to child, ever to be portrayed as an 
emancipatory advance. If anything, it reflects a deep sense of obedience. 
These themes of suffering and autonomy are closely connected. The 
suggestion that it might be good, at least in some circumstances, for human 
beings to submit to a larger order, rather than simply to forge the future 
they want, is immediately suspect to those whose primary framework is 
political and emancipatory. This probably explains the hostility of the 
critics to any hint that people should embrace suffering willingly, at least in 
some cases, as part of the human vocation. Suffering is rather to be 
regarded negatively - the only thing to be said about it is that it should be 
alleviated. The suggestion that it might enoble in any way inevitably gives 
the wrong impression, leading people into an unhealthy passivity. The 
authors condemn the authoritative belief system which could produce a life 
. Iike that of Gianna Berreta Molla. This is strangely ironic - a different 
point of view might see such a life precisely as a reason to respect the 
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system of belief which produced it. Veritatis Splendor can be read as an 
attempt to recall us to such a point of view. 
II. 
Many of the critics of Verita/is Splendor seem to miss the wood for 
the trees because they do not realize how much its outlook differs from that 
of contemporary Western society, and therefore from their own.9 Often 
enough, the current Western moral vocabulary has only one question: is the 
vocabulary ours, a product of autonomy and not of heteronomy? But as the 
encyclical implies, we are born into a sort of heteronomy, our 
consciousness being part of a larger life which we did not ourselves make, 10 
and which prescribes virtues we have to develop if we are to live a human 
life at all. The "human" is there waiting for us, before we think about it, so 
that there is something to which our vocabu laries should correspond even 
as they bring it to articulation (an articulation which is itself part of the 
"human"). But as the encyclical also insists, it is wrong to call this 
"heteronomy". !! It is rather the foundation of our limited human autonomy, 
the only sort we were made for. To consent to the human is to consent to a 
life we did not make, of which we are in a sense the stewards. This is the 
strong teaching on human nature which the encyclical wants to promote. 
The encyclical believes that there is a "truth about man as a creature" 
(VS n.3 I) and that freedom must take account of this. It sums up its main 
thesis near the beginning of the final chapter: " Freedom is rooted in the 
truth about man" (VS n.86). A statement that freedom depends on truth 
can arouse very different responses. On the one hand, the dependence can 
seem obvious. I cannot even walk through a door without first ascertaining 
where it is, and whether it is open . A freedom which tried to operate 
without attending to the prior state of the world would be a bad joke. But 
the thesis can also look like a contradiction. "Truth" refers to something 
which is there before we even consider it while "freedom" is open and 
fluid . So an attempt to submit freedom to truth can seem a denial of what 
freedom really is, reducin g it to the functions of a calculus. Telling 
someone to come to a free decision on some matter and then telling them 
that the outcome will of course be this, is a denial of freedom . The 
twentieth century contains a large literature on this, maintaining that we 
often deliberately do away with our freedom by submitting to various 
" truths." Freedom is frightening, so we tame it by bringing it under 
something else - prohibitions of nature, the Ten Commandments, the 
categorical imperative - the paraphernalia of bad faith .!2 And it can look 
as if any insistence that freedom depends on truth must come down to this. 
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A common resolution of the problem distinguishes between material 
things and human subjects, attributing a predetermined nature only to the 
former. Doors are always the sorts of things that if they are open, you can 
walk through them. But there is nothing much that human subjects always 
are, before they have decided to become something. A definition of the 
human as such is precisely a definition of something which has no essence 
in the conventional sense, as Sarte famously argues. 13 Sarte ' s position has 
lately been trumped by the more radical view which thinks that not only are 
human beings without a nature, but everything else is without one toO.14 
The encyclical wants to argue in the opposite direction to both of these, that 
(with some qualifications) human beings have a nature as other things do, 
and that this makes them part of the material creation and provides a 
natural basis for ethics. Freedom is part of a larger structured life, which it 
is intended to serve. "(I)ts absolute and unconditional origin is not in itself, 
but in the life within which it is situated ... " (VS n.86) 
The difficulty of uniting the concept of freedom with that of nature 
should not be underestimated. It can seem a contradiction to a 
consciousness formed in "modern" categories, leading inevitably to an 
unhealthy dependence on mere biology. As the encyclical notes, the 
Church ' s position on sexual morality is sometimes understood in this way, 
leading to accusations of "physicalism" or "naturalism". "Contraception" 
and "artificial insemination" are among the acts whose prohibition 
supposedly goes back to this mode of thinking. The encyclical strongly 
denies that it means anything like this (VS n.47). The same kind of 
reduction can be applied in a slightly different context (that of animal 
behavior) to yield different results. We can try to found an ethics on what 
most people do most of the time. Surveys of behavior tell us what is 
"normal" and this is the nearest we get to a specification of what people 
should do (VS n.46). But as the encyclical points out, we cannot deduce a 
normative morality from the behavioral sciences (VS n.11 I) . In any case, 
the things most people do most of the time do not reflect human nature at 
its best, as we live in a fallen world . The world reflected in statistical 
surveys is not the world as it was originally meant to be (VS n.112). 
To a "modem" consciousness, these seem to be the only possibilities 
for understanding a freedom which is obedient to nature. Since such 
possibilities cannot found an ethics, the major premise tends to be 
abandoned in favor ofa nature which is obedient to human freedom (or can 
be rendered so). This leads to ethical approaches which try to "overcome" 
nature, or which at best use it as a base for the cultural constructions of 
freedom (VS n.46). Both of these need to take account of the way nature 
is. But any deeper idea of obedience to nature is foreign to them. Their 
approach is ultimately calculative, seeing nature as something to be 
August, 2000 15 
handled and managed, rather than part of what the subject itself is, to which 
we owe a kind of obedience. 
These approaches raise questions as to the identity of the self who 
makes such ethical deci s ions. The encyclical makes the significant 
comment during its discllss ion of these approaches that the " modem" 
understanding leaves the human being without a nature at all (VS n.436). 
The self can be identified only with freedom. This does not mean it is 
entirely without moral orientation - freedom itself may impose certain 
demands, as Kant believed. But it lacks any original commitment to a 
particular sort of bodily life, a belief that the bodily human being was 
originally made to do some things and not others. 
III. 
The encyclical believes that the goods which the human being was 
made to achieve are not just the goods of a rational decision-maker, but of a 
bodily creature. There is a way human beings are meant to live, before 
they even give thought to the matter - a certain sort of life they are made 
for. One way of looking at moral action is to see it as an assent to what 
God made us. In order to think this, the encyclical insists on the unity of 
the bodily and spiritual sides of human life, refusing "any division between 
freedom and nature" (VS n.50). It refers to the Catholic Church ' s 
endorsement of the Aristotelean teaching of the unity of the human person, 
"whose rational soul is per se et essentialiter the fonn of his body" (VS 
n.48). The finalities of bodily functions are not merely "physical" or "pre-
moral". The body offers "reference points for moral decisions." We do not 
just take account of material realities, but are in the first place a natural, 
material reality. So we discover in the body, " the anticipatory signs, the 
expression and the promise of the gift of self, in confonnity with the wise 
plan of the Creator" (VS n.48). In other words, the body contains 
indications of the moral form which a life is to take. Freedom has larger 
obligations, beginning "not in itself, but in the life within which it is 
situated" (VS n.86). This means that it is possible for free actions to 
contradict the meaning of the life which they should express. The 
encyclical refers to "manipulations of corporeity which alter its human 
meaning" (VS n.50). 
Those who think instinctively in "modem" categories can feel lost as 
to what the encyclical is proposing here, how we can speak of bodily 
relations as the bearers of moral significance without falling into a 
"naturalist" interpretation. This is a very old problem. W.K.C. Guthrie 
traces the various types of sophism in fifth century Greece back to the 
separation of physis from nomos.' s This distinction, often translated as the 
16 Linacre Quarterly 
distinction between nature and culture, is an ancestor of contemporary 
distinctions between nature and history, or nature and freedom. Plato 
shows that once physis and nomos are separated like this, our rationality 
loses any deeper basis it might have had. Either it seems to support mere 
phys ical interests, as in Thrasymachus' view that justice is really the 
interests of the powerful , or it seems to construct whatever it wants on the 
basis of the physical, as in Ca llicles ' view that justice is really a fiction 
constructed by the weak to defend themselves against the strong. 16 
As it clearly indicates, the encyclical is philosophically Aristotelean 
here. Aristotle saw that human reason does not simply promote the 
"animal" goods of a wider human life, as if reason had a mere instrumental 
relation to them. It also transforms such a life, so that the "passionate" 
elements serve the " rational". 17 But such a transformation is not a fiction 
created by reason, which does violence to our animal nature. The human 
"passionate" elements were meant to be informed by the rational ,18 which 
brings the physical life of humans to the perfection it was made for . That 
we should discuss political goods with others, and build a common order in 
which they can be achieved, is not a complicated way of imposing power, 
or disguising our lack of it. Rather such talk is itself one of the goods of 
the animal we are. In a certain sense, our talk is not a product of nature - if 
it were, we would all talk the same language. But that we should talk is 
natural , for all that, one of the peculiarities of our nature being that it 
should complete itself through what is not merely "natural". 
It might help to take a particular example here, one which the 
encyclical mentions in passing, the command to "honor one ' s parents" (VS 
n.52). The peculiarity of this injunction can escape us, it is such a familiar 
part of our ethical inheritance . Why exactly should I incur ethical 
obligations towards people simply because of a physical accident - that 
they happen to be the ones through whom I came into the world? One can 
attempt to reduce freedom to nature here, saying that humans care for their 
young simply out of felt in stinct. Or one can move in the opposite 
direction, trying to establish the injunction on the basis of a freedom or 
rationality which is independent of any contingent material relations. For 
example, I could say that I "owe my parents a debt of gratitude" for their 
having supported me through my childhood and youth . But this may not be 
true - my parents may not have performed their duties particularly well. 
Anyway, the basics for a contract are lacking. I never gave my consent to 
it. Or we could argue from the direction of the general good, that society is 
better off when the younger generation respects the older. This again 
submits the injunction to a higher set of principles, which apply 
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universally, and reduces obligations to parents to a more general obligation 
towards the good of society as a whole. 
But the encyclical wants to maintain the injunction as a primary moral 
command which follows on my being born to these parents. Sheer biology 
has a part to play in the structure of moral obligation . Or it might be better 
to say that biology is never simply " sheer" biology, where human beings 
are concerned. Bodily existence itself, by establishing us at a particular 
point in the material creation, founds our first moral obligations. One of 
the effects of this approach is to limit the obligations we incur. Catholic 
moral teaching based on natural law is sometimes reproached for lay ing 
burdens on human shoulders. But in a sense, it does just the opposite, 
limiting the responsibilities of human beings. We are not in the first place 
spiritual subjects who face the whole of the material creation, with 
responsibilities for all of it (perhaps leaving us with the feeling that we do 
not know where to start), but bodily subjects who grow up with obligations 
towards some people which we do not have towards others. 
The position has an important consequence for contemporary 
discussions in Catholic moral theology. While every ethics admits that 
calculations of consequences play some part in moral decisions, the 
encyclical ' s position implies that such calculations are not the primary 
form of moral reflection . The converse of the example described above is a 
further useful illustration . Thomas Aquinas sees the duty of parents to look 
after their children as part of the natural law, foll owing on the fact that the 
children owe their existence to their parents.19 We could well imagine a 
parent making many decisions in fulfillment of this duty which involved 
weighing of goods against other goods, and balancing good effects of 
decisions against the inevitable negative effects (Which school should my 
children attend? Should they learn music?, etc.). But the parent does not 
regard the original duty of being a good parent as subject to such a 
calculus. It is not as if the children are to be looked after only if this proves 
the best thing for me to do after this has been weighed against other 
possible courses of action . If it comes down to a choice between looking 
after my children or taking up an important political office (and I cannot do 
both), there should be no choice, even if it seems I could do more for my 
country than anyone else could. My detailed activity of weighing goods 
and evils takes place within a context of bodily relations which is already 
given to me, a context which is not itself to be submitted to such a calculus. 
This context arises out of my material existence, as one who has parented 
these particular children. 
This position holds that the ends of a human life are given in advance 
and that its free actions should aim to achieve such ends. Above all , it 
leads to an ethics suitable for creatures, who also share in God ' s 
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providence (VS n. 43). One of the implications of this way of thinking is 
that it is also possible to act in ways which disregard the life a human being 
was made for, and are therefore inhuman. Certain negative precepts 
safeguard the minimum required for the human to be present at all. For 
example, the encyclical describes precepts against lying or directly killing 
the innocent as " universally binding" and " unchanging" (VS n.52). 
Assuming one of these actions is in question, the precept obliges 
" regardless of cost" (VS n.51) . [n such cases people should consider the 
matter closed, and should not even begin to calculate the consequences. 
Might the direct killing of the innocent sometimes be justified - in wartime 
for example? The encyclical ' s response : do not ask, do not even begin to 
calculate. There is no space between avoiding evil and avoiding certain 
actions. A voiding the latter is a constitutive part of the former, for a human 
being. As the encyclical puts it (somewhat opaquely), the prohibition of 
such actions does not "inhibit" a good intention, but is its "basic 
expression" (VS n.82). Once again, this limits the responsibility of 
humans. We should not see ourselves as responsible for the physical evils 
which may follow a refusal to act in an inhuman way. This position 
reflects a trust in Providence, and a sense of a limited human role in the 
scheme of things, as befits an ethic of creatures. When tempted by actions 
which should never be done, humans should simply act rightly; the 
outcome of the refusal to do evil is the affair of God, who made the larger 
order in which such a situation could arise, and Who will bring it to its 
perfection in His own way. 
Such a concept of human nature also provides a standard to assess the 
actions of those who go beyond the minimum required for an action to 
count as human . There is no " higher limit" to the love of God and neighbor 
(VS n.52), so that there is infinite room for actions which show the nature 
of the human being writ large. One of the reasons why the case of the 
Italian woman already quoted is so striking is that her action surely 
expresses something of what being a parent always is, the gift of oneself 
over many years, which children are never really able to repay, and which 
they can at best pass on to others when they become parents in their tum. 
Certain actions sum up what humans always are, even if they show it writ 
large, and in a form that others are not obliged directly to imitate. Such 
actions are desperately important for us, keeping alive as they do our sense 
of what it is to be human . And if they fundamentally challenge 
contemporary vocabularies for which autonomy is the highest value, and 
"human nature" has no meaning, then so much the worse for the 
vocabularies. 
To see examples like that of Mrs. Molla as fundamental, providing an 
original measure for human vocabularies by indicating what it is they are 
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trying to bring to expression, is to grasp the encyclical ' s teaching on human 
nature. "(T)here is something in man which transcends ... cultures. This 
' something' is precisely human nature : this nature is itself the measure of 
culture .. . " (VS n.53). To admit this is to acquire eyes once again for the 
beautiful actions which humans tum up from time to time (perhaps 
surprising even themselves), discovering and bringing to perfection a self 
whose laws they did not construct, and which are always stranger than they 
thought. Such examples remind us of what we already knew but had 
forgotten in the pressures of everyday - what it is to be one of God ' s 
human creatures. This is the truth which precedes our freedom, the one of 
which the encyclical wants to remind us. 
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